|
 The
Republic of Cote d'Ivoire
is located in the Western African region and expands over a total
area of: 322,460 sq. km (land: 318,000 sq. km water: 4,460 sq. km)
Its population
numbers 15,818,068 (1999) 16,962,491(July 2003 est.) with a population growth
rate of: 2.35% (1999) 2.15% (2003 est.)
The
bordering countries are: in the East: the Republic of
Ghana over 668 km; in the Northeast the
Republic of Burkina Faso over 584; in
the Northwest the Republic of Mali over
532; in the West the Republics of Guinea
over 610 and Liberia over 716
It has a coastline of 515 km
alongside the Gulf of Guinea.
Independence
from France on August
7, 1960
National
holiday: August
7
Natural
resources: petroleum,
diamonds, manganese, iron ore, cobalt, bauxite, copper.
Agriculture
production: coffee,
cocoa beans (first world producer), bananas, palm kernels, corn, rice, manioc
(tapioca), sweet potatoes, sugar, cotton, rubber; timber.
Industrial
production: foodstuffs,
beverages; wood products, oil refining, automobile assembly, textiles, fertilizer,
construction materials, electricity.
Industrial
production growth rate nose dived from
15% (1998-1999) to a meager 1% (1999 to 2000). The downward
trend will sharpen further as a result of six months civil war (September 19,
2002 - March 7, 2003) as below extensively exposed.
Cote-d'Ivoire
was till the beginning of the civil war on September 19, 2002, the economic heavyweight
of West-Africa's French speaking countries.
It
represents 37.5% of the GNP (July 2003) - down from 40% in September 2002 and
60% in the 1980's - of West African Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA)
, which members' states are: Benin,
Niger, Burkina-Faso,
Mali, Senegal,
Guinea-Bissau and Togo.
The economic performance
of the country is based on agriculture. Ivory Coast is one of the world's largest
producer and exporter of coffee, cocoa beans and palm oil. However,
the economy is highly sensitive to the pricing fluctuations of these products
on the international marketplace. Nevertheless, the country enjoyed twenty five
years of sustained economic growth from 1960 to 1985, which increased steadily
the per capita GNP to up to US$ 1,200 (1999) against an average of US$ 400 in
surrounding countries.
From
1986, the economy began to stagnate and experienced negative growth (-1.8%). The
100% devaluation of Zone Franc's currency (CFA)
on January 12, 1994 triggered a reverse of the downward trend and boosted the
export of agricultural commodities: cocoa, coffee and the pineapple and rubber.
The national budget then
garnered "huge" liquidity coming from the privatization of state's owned
enterprises, the liberalization of the banking system, the discoveries of offshore
oil and gas in addition to generous external financing and debt rescheduling granted
by bilateral and international institutions financing bodies.
Government compliance to reforms
requested by the IMF and the World Bank coupled with the impact of the CFA's 100%
devaluation boosted the economic growth rate to 6% annually from 1996 to 1998.
However, from
mid 1999 the economy slid backwards again. That was the direct consequence of
the refusal by international aid donors to continue financing contribution - unless
the Ivorian government takes necessary measures to stamp out corruption and strictly
adhere to donor-mandated reforms.
From the same period the economic situation deteriorated further due to the political
tension arising from obstacles
set up by Bedie's regime to eliminate the main opposition leader - RDR's Alassane
Dramane Ouattara - from October 2000's presidential ballot.
On
December 24, 1999 a bloodless "coup" cooled down the political tension.
Bedie lost the state power and fled the country. The reprieve, however, was just
for a short term. The political situation did not clarified.
Gueî, the beneficiary of the coup, backed by southerner
political leaders added to the confusion: they adopted the "Ivoirité"
concept - cooked by Bedie - which is in the center of the political crisis since
1996.
Finally, Alassane Dramane Ouattara - and several other candidates - were banned
from running for the presidential ballot of October 22, 2000.
Amongst those allowed to run
was Laurent Gbagbo of the
Ivorian Popular Front / "Front Populaire Ivoirien - FPI".
The only "heavyweight" politician to confront General Robert Gueï.
The presidential
ballot took place as scheduled on October 22, 2000 with a low turnout - 30% of
the constituency casting ballots. Ouattara's RDR (The Democratic Rally for
the Republic) boycotting. On October 25, 2000 Robert Gueï attempted to
hijack the election canceling the votes' count and proclaiming himself head of
state. His move was immediately challenged by Laurent Gbagbo's activists. They
took to the streets (backed by Army troops - the Gendarmerie in particular) in
Abidjan; San Pedro and Gagnoa in the Southwest; and Bouaké in the center
of Cote d'Ivoire. Few hours of street riots were enough to topple Gueï's
military regime.
On October 26, 2000, Alassane
Dramane Ouattara's followers also took to the streets protesting against the recognition
of Laurent Gbagbo as President-elect - contesting the election process. Chaos
and confusion rocked through Abidjan. Mosques and churches
set ablaze.
Since that date of October 26, 2000 a civil unrest and defiance
atmosphere was perceptible in the Northern region against the national government.
The Gbagbo's regime did nothing to cool the situation. In the contrary,
it implemented political decisions - in line with the
Ivorité concept cooked by Bedie. That is to say the continual harassment
of army staff originating from the North of the country; refusal to deliver ID
cards to those who are not born from two Ivorian parents - the case of the majority
of Northerners. Etc.
Feeling strangers in their own country, Northerners
decided to topple Gbago's regime. They staged a rebellion on September 22, 2002
and succeeded capturing 60% of national territory.
ALL MEDIATIONS FAILED TO RECONCILE THE ANTAGONISTIC PARTIES
Since
September 22, 2002 several diplomatic attempts had been made by the international
community to mending fences between the antagonistic parties.
After
the "failure" of several West African countries' mediations sponsored
by Senegal's Wade and late Togo's Eyadema, France, the former colonial power,
took over (January 2003) and "cooked" the Linas-Marcoussis
Agreement that also established a Reconcilement Government
As soon
as he was back to his turf, in Abidjan, Gbagbo, who attended the signature's ceremony
at Paris but oddly enough did not sign the document, systematically sabotaged
the Agreement's implementation. His followers and staunch activists - Les
Jeunes Patriotes / Young Patriots - took to the streets with huge rallies to denounce
the Agreement.
Worse, on November 4, 2004 he resumed the war launching air strikes against the rebels held towns of Bouaké and Korhogo.
During one of the strikes on Bouaké (the capital City of the Rebels), on November 6, 2004, a position monitored by La Force Licorne - French Peace Keeping Force in Ivory Coast - was hit. 9 French soldiers were killed and a score wounded. France's Jacques Chirac immediately ordered the destruction of Ivorian Air Defense equipment. French commandos wiped out two warplanes and six choppers depriving the Gbagbo's regime from its air striking power.
The destruction of the Ivorian Air Defense becomes then the pretext for Gbagbo's militia (Les Jeunes Patriotes) to go on rampage around Abidjan, rioting, attacking French economic interests and expatriates.
Several other meetings: Accra I, Accra II, Accra III - Pretoria I and Pretoria II failed to reconcile the antagonistic parties, which refuse to comply to the agreements' recommendations:
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1- Gbagbo' side asking for the disarmament of the "Rebels" before any political settlement
2- And the Rebels / Forces Nouvelles asking for the fulfillment of Marcoussis Agreement before the disarmament process. |
-
OUAGADOUGOU AGREEMENT: ANOTHER DEAD AGREEMENT OR FINALLY A NEW START?.
On October 06, 2005, African Union's Peace and Security Council
(PSC) adopted political decisions, which had been translated on October
21, 2005, into UN' Security
Council Resolution 1633 that could be summarized in four points:
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1- Laurent Gbagbo's mandate as Ivory Coast's President ends on October 30, 2005. However, he should stay as Head of State for another year.
2- He has to transfer some executive powers to a new prime minister acceptable to all Ivorian parties.
3- The ministers of the new Reconcilement Government (designated by the parties which attended and signed Linas Marcoussis Agreement) would report to the Prime Minister.
4- The new Reconcilement Government to execute Linas Marcoussis and Accra III Agreements. |
But 12
months further, little progress was made and presidential
ballot scheduled for end of October 2006 (UN's Resolution 1633) was cancelled.
On November 2, 2006, UN Security
Council unanimously endorsed Resolution 1721 that gave extended power to Konan
Banny, the Prime Minister, to lead the transitional government up to the presidential
ballot that should occur within a period of 12 months maximum.
Under Resolution 1721 rule, Gbagbo maneuvered
to outclass Banny, who did not grab the full power granted to him by the international
community. And the peace process was stalled once more.
To find a way out and allay the international community's suspicion that
he is playing against the peace process, Gbagbo "cooked" another
strategy called Direct Dialogue that is face to face negotiation
with the Forces Nouvelles. He
lobbies with Burkina's Compaoré (the acting Ecowas's
president) to have the Direct Dialogue under his supervision.
So, from February 5 to March 4, 2007, a round of negotiation
was held in Ouagadougou, Burkina-Faso, between Gbagbo and the Forces Nouvelles
that lead to another peace agreement, which main characteristics are:
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1-
A Single Counter (Guichet Unique) for the identification process
2- A National Committee in charge of Defense and Security grouping former
rebels' northern military forces and South security forces.
3- A new transitional government to be formed one month after the Agreement
signature.
4- The retreat of the UN and Force Licorne interposition from the buffer-
zone established to separate North' and South's armies and avoid a full
civil war. |
No
mention was made about the name of the prime minister of the forthcoming new government.
Banny had not been invited to attend the Direct Dialogue. He had been appointed
by UN Resolution 1721. Now, would the Ouagadougou's Dialogue Direct Agreement
remove him from the premiership position?
BANNY OUT SORO IN
The implementation scheduling attached to Ouagadougou Agreement seems to be carried out by both parties without "glitches". 10 days after the signature, both armies had established the National Committee in charge of Defense and Security, and on March 29, 2007, Soro had been appointed Prime Minister.
On April 7, 2007, the "new" government had been established. Not so new, as ministerial positions held by the Alliance of the Houphouetists remained unchanged. That is the same people designated by the Alliance main partners (RDR and PDCI) and holding ministerial positions in Banny's government are still present in Soro's government - and holding the same ministerial positions.
Only positions held by Gbagbo's FPI and Soro's Forces Nouvelles had seen new faces. So, the Ministry of Interior is now the turf of the former Gbagbo's spokesperson, Desire Tagro.
Therefore, one can say that the only real change is the replacement of Konan Banny by Soro as Prime Minister. Indeed, the former is the "big" looser, who has only himself to blame for the turn out of events. He had been appointed by UN Resolution 1633 and confirmed by Resolution 1721 with extended decision-making political powers. And oddly enough he did not exercised these powers during his 15 months of stay as Prime Minister. He avoided as much as possible to "confront" Gbagbo, trying, for no avail to "build" for himself a consensual political status.
Further, he had even "disbanded" his government when a toxic-waste scandal (blamed upon Gbagbo's people acting in the state machine) erupted at the end of year 2006, and handed over his resignation to Gbagbo, who then reappointed him to the position. By so doing, he had willingly destroyed the legal basis of his appointment by the International Community.
Worse, Gbagbo also reappointed people Banny had sacked (seen as responsible for the toxic-waste scandal), and Banny was incapable of challenging the decision.
- WHAT NEXT?
So, as above outlined, Soro's government is not so "new" compared to the one established by Banny on January 2006. There is, however, a real change in the political struggle going on in Ivory Coast as Soro seemingly has obtained "free hand" (in accordance with Article 53 of the Constitution) to rule and effectively take necessary decisions, to "manage" and implement Ouagadougou Agreement, which had been structured on Marcoussis Agreement and all subsequent Agreements and UN Resolutions.
The big question is: Why Gbagbo is now apparently willing and ready to leave Soro rule and implement these agreements, when he had astutely maneuvered to blocking two previous reconcilement prime ministers - Diarra and Banny - to do so? Would he continues to play a "fair" political game and allow for the full distribution of citizenship ID cards to people from the North?
Indeed, if the identification and ID distribution process go to full implementation, at least 1,500,000 new citizens from the North would be listed to vote for the presidential ballot now scheduled to take place in 10-month time. These new citizens cannot, for certain, be considered as Gbagbo's followers. So, why such a gift to his opponent - RDR's boss Dramane Ouattara?
One has to wait to see the outcome of Ouagadougou Agreement, that cannot and should not fail. In case such failure does occur, the eruption of full civil war between Gbagbo's activists and his opponents from the North and the South is a high-risk possibility.
Indeed, one of Ouagadougou Agreement decision to be executed on April 16, 2007, is potent of looming disaster in case the agreement is not fully executed
by both parties. That is the retreat of the international interposition forces
separating both antagonistic armies - before the Agreement is fully implemented.
There is only one true winner that is Burkina's Compaoré,
who demonstrated his dedication to bringing peace to a country, whose
leaders (Gbagbo's camp in particular) had accused him of being the
mastermind behind the aborted coup of September 22, 2002 that led to
the partition. Now, no one can say Compaoré would be responsible
again of staging troubles if the Agreement is not fully executed to
establishing peace.
So, what is next?
A miracle for peace? Or full civil war if the Agreement failed. Let's
wait and see. .
One thing is sure, the political imbroglio had reached a final
turning point - for the better or the worse. The three
coming months shall indicate which scenario would prevail.
- OUAGADOUGOU AGREEMENT MADE NO MENTION OF THE EXILED DISSIDENT MILITARY
The Agreement did
not make any mention of the "plight" of the exiled military
personnel. Would they be reintegrated into the national Army? Because,
if they are not, what would be their administrative status?
Are they going to be hanging in the air, without financial resources
to live on and sustain family life? If that is the case, they might
stage trouble.
One thing is sure, in case the Agreement stalls and mess prevails, these "dissident" Military personnel may be tempted
to enter the fray. Indeed, a score of military men - the former Army's
Chief of Staff, General Mathias Doué, backed and followed by
several officers in exile - declared, on August 2005, that "they
think Gbagbo is the obstacle to peace; and that they are warning the
international community to take necessary measures to remove him from
power to avoid a bloodshed in the country".
These military men may be wrong but are apparently dedicated to follow suit as the exiled military men did in September 22, 2009 to staging a coup that toppled the elected and ruling president Bedié.
THE ECONOMY IS
IN TATTER
The economy, which was already on a steep decline trend (the
per Capita Gross National Product nose dived from US$1,200 in
1999 to US$382 in 2006) would deteriorate further. The
expatriates that are fleeing the countries, European and African
alike, are entrepreneurs. That means closing of hundred of shops,
industrial concerns, agribusiness and services companies. Loss
of thousand of jobs in a country where the unemployment is already
flirting with 60% of the working force.
Indeed, hundred of small-scale businesses,
in services, manufacturing and agriculture - set up over four decades
- are now either severely disrupted or simply bankrupted. Sugarcane and cotton
agribusiness, located in the Northern part of the country, suffered production
dislocation and export disturbances. Cocoa and coffee agribusiness are also in
big trouble. The quality of cocoa beans, for instance, dropped, from international
standard and producers are selling year 2006s harvest to purchasers from Guinea,
Mali and Burkina bypassing the statutory local bodies in charge.
Thousand of workers and employees are out of job. The transportation business,
by road or railways, between the North and the South, is severely disrupted and
damaged. Click here to choose
a country to visit
In brief, within a short five-year period of political haggling
and a
stupid "civil war", the damage to the economy
is immense and Ivory Coast shall experience negative growth
rate for at least two to three years running - despite the denial by Gbagbo and followers. Conservative forecast
for Year 2005 is - 15.5%. Down from - 2.5% in 2002 and -10.5%
in 20045
Further, neighboring landlocked countries
i.e. Mali and Burkina Faso hastily
rerouted import and export's activities. Policy-makers of said countries would
not certainly totally reverse to the former route to the port of Abidjan once
the political situation stabilizes. Therefore Abidjan's harbor, the first in the
Region in haulage and containers dispatching activities for two decades running,
will have to face an increasing harsh competition from Dakar/ Senegal, Tema/ Ghana,
Cotonou/ Benin and Lome/ Togo and even so far as Douala/ Cameroon - Click
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Now that the Ivorians experienced
the bitter taste of economic decline and its dire consequences with regards deteriorated living conditions, sharp increase of poverty level in the populations, job losses, abrupt jump of criminality - physical and legal, let us hope they learnt their lesson and will stop playing with the Ivoirite concept.
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